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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JOHN LIPTOK,

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Plaintiff,
v.
FACEBOOK, et al.,
Defendants.

CIV NO. 3:21-CV-2141
(Judge Wilson)
(Magistrate Judge Carlson)

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I.

Factual Background
John Liptok is undeniably an angry man, a regrettable personal quality which

interferes with his ability to conduct litigation in a cogent, coherent fashion. We
have, in the past, urged Liptok to temper his rage with reason, explaining to him that
his “persistent petulance . . . calls to mind the wisdom of the American humorist
Will Rogers, who once said: ‘People who fly into a rage always make a bad
landing.’” Liptok v. Bank of Am., No. 3:15-CV-156, 2016 WL 6818362, at *1 (M.D.
Pa. Oct. 20, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:15CV156, 2016 WL
6780757 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 16, 2016), aff'd, 773 F. App'x 97 (3d Cir. 2019). We have
further urged Liptok to consider the fact that his:
[L]argely inarticulate anger has frustrated every effort to fairly address
his underlying concerns. This unthinking anger has also seemingly
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rendered Liptok both blind and deaf. Thus, Liptok seems blind to the
consequences which must inevitably flow from a wholesale refusal to
follow the court's instructions, and has consistently been deaf to the
entreaties of the court that he follow the rules when prosecuting the case
which he elected to file in federal court.
Id. Moreover, we have not been alone in observing that Liptok’s unthinking anger
stymies all efforts to address his concerns in a rational fashion. As the Pennsylvania
Superior Court noted in 2015, when it dismissed a pro se criminal appeal
by Liptok from a state summary offense conviction, oftentimes Liptok's filings are
“incomprehensible and lack[ ] pertinent analysis.” Com. v. Liptok, No. 176 MDA
2014, 2015 WL 6179515, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 23, 2015).
Further, oftentimes, Mr. Liptok would engage in verbally abusive exchanges
with others, misconduct that caused us to “warn[] Liptok on numerous occasions
that ‘the routine use of personal invective, acerbic asides, caustic commentaries,
disgruntled digressions, and ad hominem observations’ will not be permitted by the
court and will result in pleadings being stricken by the court.” Liptok, 2016 WL
6818362, at *2.
We are reminded of the challenges which John Liptok presents as a pro se
litigant as we turn to the consideration of this, one of his latest filings. This pro se,
in forma pauperis lawsuit comes before us for a legally mandated screening review
of the plaintiff’s complaint. (Doc. 1). Mr. Liptok’s latest four-page complaint names
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Facebook and Mark Zuckerberg as defendants. While the complaint is written in a
stream of consciousness style that demands a great deal from the reader, the gist of
Liptok’s complaint seems to be that he has been placed in “virtual prison” by
Facebook, i.e., he had his Facebook access restricted after some of his
communications were deemed to be abusive, offensive, and violative of Facebook
policies. Liptok appears to take particular umbrage at this action by Facebook
because he alleges that he received 2,000,000 votes for President of the United States
in 2020, and he contends that Facebook improperly puts him “in PRISON every time
I say ANYTHING POLITICAL.” (Id. at 3). On the basis of these averments, Liptok
seeks $10,000,000 in damages

and a criminal prosecution of Facebook and

Zuckerberg. (Id. at 4).
Along with his complaint Liptok has filed a motion for leave to proceed in
forma pauperis. (Doc. 2). We will direct that the lodged complaint be filed on the
docket for screening purposes and will conditionally GRANT the plaintiff’s motion
for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. However, for the reasons set forth below, it
is recommended that the complaint be dismissed.
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II.

Discussion
A.

Screening of Pro Se Complaints–Standard of Review

This Court has an ongoing statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary
review of pro se complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed in forma
pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, we are obliged to review
the complaint to determine whether any claims are frivolous, malicious, or fail to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. This statutory text mirrors the
language of Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides
that a complaint should be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
With respect to this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving
standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:
Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in
recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court’s opinion in Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) continuing with our
opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir.
2008)] and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in
Ashcroft v. Iqbal 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009) pleading
standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more
heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than
the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).
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In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all
reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom are to be construed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc.,
20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s
bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v.
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally, a court
need not “assume that a . . . plaintiff can prove facts that the . . . plaintiff has not
alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters,
459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action, a plaintiff
must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not
do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level.” Id.
In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has
underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon
which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to
5
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dismiss, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by
mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a
review of the adequacy of complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that
they must:
[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than
conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal
conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be
supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.
Id. at 679.
Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal a well-pleaded complaint must contain
more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a complaint must recite factual
allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level
of mere speculation. As the Third Circuit has stated:
[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First,
the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The
District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as
true but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court
must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are
sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a “plausible claim for relief.” In
other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's
entitlement to relief. A complaint has to “show” such an entitlement
with its facts.
Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.
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Two years after Fowler, the Third Circuit further observed:
The Supreme Court in Twombly set forth the “plausibility” standard for
overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Iqbal. The
plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege “enough facts to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard
when the factual pleadings “allow[ ] the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S. Ct. 1955).
This standard requires showing “more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. A complaint which pleads facts
“merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, [ ] “stops short of the
line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement of relief.’”
Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 220-21 (3d Cir. 2011).
In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a
three-step analysis:
First, the court must “tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead
to state a claim.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should
identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions,
are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 1950. Finally, “where
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement for relief.” Id.
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).
In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the
requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, which defines what
a complaint should say and provides that:
7
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(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and
plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the
court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional
support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought,
which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and
conclusions. Rather, a pro se plaintiff’s complaint must recite factual allegations that
are sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere
speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.
B.

This Complaint Should Be Dismissed under Rule 8.

At the outset, this complaint violates the strictures of Rule 8 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in that Liptok has failed to state well-pleaded facts in
support of these claims. Dismissal of a complaint is appropriate when the complaint
plainly fails to comply with Rule 8's basic injunction that, “[a] pleading that states a
claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.” It is well settled that, “[t]he Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain ‘a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and that
each averment be >concise, and direct,= Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1).” Scibelli v. Lebanon
Cty., 219 F. App=x 221, 222 (3d Cir. 2007). Thus, when a complaint is “illegible or
8
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incomprehensible,” id., or when a complaint “is not only of an unwieldy length, but
it is also largely unintelligible,” Stephanatos v. Cohen, 236 F. App=x 785, 787 (3d
Cir. 2007), an order dismissing a complaint under Rule 8 is clearly appropriate. See,
e.g., Mincy v. Klem, 303 F. App=x 106 (3d Cir. 2008); Rhett v. N.J. State Super. Ct.,
260 F. App=x 513 (3d Cir. 2008); Stephanatos, 236 F. App=x 785; Scibelli, 219 F.
App=x 221; Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 450 n.1 (5th Cir.
2005).
Dismissal under Rule 8 is also proper when a complaint “left the defendants
having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action],”
Binsack v. Lackawanna Cnty. Prison, 438 F. App=x 158 (3d Cir. 2011), or when the
complaint is so “rambling and unclear” as to defy response. Tillio v. Spiess, 441
F.App=x 109 (3d Cir. 2011). Similarly, dismissal is appropriate in “‘those cases in
which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible
that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.’” Id. at 110 (quoting Simmons v.
Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86 (2d Cir. 1995)); Tillio v. Northland Grp. Inc., 456 F. App'x
78, 79 (3d Cir. 2012). Further, a complaint may be dismissed under Rule 8 when the
pleading is simply illegible and cannot be understood. See, e.g., Radin v. Jersey City
Med. Ctr., 375 F. App=x 205 (3d Cir. 2010); Moss v. U.S., 329 F. App'x 335 (3d Cir.
2009) (dismissing illegible complaint); Earnest v. Ling, 140 F. App=x 431 (3d Cir.
9
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2005) (dismissing complaint where “complaint fails to clearly identify which parties
[the plaintiff] seeks to sue”); Oneal v. U.S. Fed. Prob., CIV.A. 05-5509 (MLC), 2006
WL 758301 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2006) (dismissing complaint consisting of
approximately 50 pages of mostly-illegible handwriting); Gearhart v. City of Phila.
Police, CIV.A.06-0130, 2006 WL 446071 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2006) (dismissing
illegible complaint).1
In this case Liptok’s complaint violates Rule 8’s dictate that a complaint “must
contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Far from being a plain statement showing how Liptok is entitled
to relief from Facebook and Zuckerberg, this filing leaves all of the Adefendants
having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action].@
Binsack, 438 F. App=x 158. Therefore, Rule 8 compels dismissal of the complaint.
Furthermore, Liptok’s allegations that he may be entitled to some special
status because he is a leading Presidential contender who garnered 2,000,000 votes
in the 2020 election implicates additional grounds for dismissal of this lawsuit since
it is well-settled that:

1

In the first instance, Rule 8 dismissals are often entered without prejudice to
allowing the litigant the opportunity to amend and cure any defects. See, e.g., Rhett,
260 F. App=x 513; Stephanatos, 236 F. App=x 785; Scibelli, 219 F. App=x 221.
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[A] complaint may be subject to dismissal because it presents a cause
of action that “relies on ‘fantastic or delusional scenarios.’ Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338
(1989).” DeGrazia v. F.B.I., 316 F. App'x 172, 173 (3d Cir. 2009).
Furthermore, we are obliged to “sua sponte dismiss a complaint for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) when the allegations within the complaint ‘are so
attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit, ...
wholly insubstantial, ... obviously frivolous, ... plainly unsubstantial, ...
or no longer open to discussion.’ Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 53637, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974).” DeGrazia, 316 F. App'x at
173.
Vance v. McGinley, No. 1:21-CV-892, 2021 WL 2906070, at *4 (M.D. Pa. June 21,
2021), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:21-CV-892, 2021 WL 2894826
(M.D. Pa. July 9, 2021). To the extent that Liptok believes what he has averred in
this regard, he appears that he is relying upon fantastic or delusional scenarios of the
type which justify dismissal of his complaint.
C.

Liptok’s Claims Fail on Their Merits as Pleaded.

While Liptok’s cryptic style of pleading leaves us at sea in ascertaining the
true nature of his complaint, very liberally construed it appears that Liptok may be
endeavoring to sue Facebook and Zuckerberg under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
civil rights violations. If this is what Liptok is attempting to do, then this attempt
runs afoul of settled legal principles. It is well established that § 1983 does not by
its own force, create new and independent legal rights to damages in civil rights
actions. Rather, § 1983 simply serves as a vehicle for private parties to bring civil
11
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actions to vindicate violations of separate and pre-existing legal rights otherwise
guaranteed under the Constitution and laws of the United States. Albright v. Oliver,
510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994); Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989).
Therefore, any analysis of the legal sufficiency of a cause of action under § 1983
must begin with an assessment of the validity of the underlying constitutional and
statutory claims advanced by the plaintiff.
In this regard, it is also well settled that:
Section 1983 provides a remedy for deprivations of federally protected
rights caused by persons acting under color of state law. The two
essential elements of a ' 1983 action are: (1) whether the conduct
complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state
law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of a federally
protected right. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).
Boykin v. Bloomsburg Univ., 893 F.Supp. 409, 416 (M.D. Pa. 1995), aff=d, 91 F.3d
122 (3d Cir. 1996) (emphasis added). Thus, it is essential to any civil rights claim
brought under § 1983 that the plaintiff allege and prove that the defendants were
acting under color of law when that defendant allegedly violated the plaintiff=s rights.
To the extent that a complaint seeks to hold private parties liable for alleged civil
rights violations, it fails to state a valid cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 since
the statute typically requires a showing that the defendants are state actors. Am.
Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999).
12
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This limitation on the reach of § 1983 is fatal to any federal civil rights claims
Liptok wishes to bring against Facebook, since courts have repeatedly found that,
“Facebook cannot be deemed a state actor. For that reason, Facebook has, as a
private entity, the right to regulate the content of its platforms as it sees fit.” Davison
v. Facebook, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 3d 621, 629 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 774 F. App'x 162 (4th
Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 1111, 206 L. Ed. 2d 182 (2020) citing La'Tiejira
v. Facebook, Inc., 272 F.Supp.3d 981, 991 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (observing
that Facebook has a “First Amendment right to decide what to publish and what not
to publish on its platform”). See Freedom Watch, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 368 F. Supp.
3d 30, 40 (D.D.C. 2019), aff'd, 816 F. App'x 497 (D.C. Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141
S. Ct. 2466, 209 L. Ed. 2d 528 (2021).
Further, when confronted with pro se complaints, like the complaint lodged
here by Liptok, which allege that Facebook has improperly denied someone access
to this social media platform due to alleged Facebook guideline violations, courts
have dismissed these claims, noting that Facebook and other internet service
providers are entitled to a safe harbor from liability under the Communications
Decency Act, which provides that:
Civil liability
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held
liable on account of—
13
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(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or
availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene,
lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected
47 U.S.C. § 230 (c)(2). Accordingly, courts that have considered such pro se
wrongful Facebook termination claims have cited § 230 when dismissing such pro
se claims on an initial screening analysis. However, these courts have done so
without prejudice to the plaintiff attempting to amend the complaint by alleging
well-pleaded facts which would take Facebook’s conduct beyond the safe harbor
prescribed by § 230. See Gomez v. Zuckenburg, No. 520CV633TJMTWD, 2020
WL 7684956, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. July 23, 2020), report and recommendation
adopted, No. 520CV633TJMTWD, 2020 WL 7065816 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 3, 2020).
This is the course we recommend in the instant case. We recommend this
course mindful of the fact that in civil rights cases pro se plaintiffs often should be
afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in
its entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247,
253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to amend is not necessary in a case
such as this where amendment would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston v.
Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). Accordingly, with one exception discussed
below, it is recommended that the Court provide the plaintiff with an opportunity to
14
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correct these deficiencies in the pro se complaint, by dismissing this deficient
complaint without prejudice to one final effort by the plaintiff to comply with the
rules governing civil actions in federal court.
We note, however, that one claim that Liptok pursues in this complaint should
be dismissed with prejudice. In his pro se pleading, Liptok urges the court to institute
a criminal prosecution or investigation of Facebook and Zuckerberg on his behalf.
This we cannot do. Quite the contrary:
It is well established that decisions regarding the filing of criminal
charges are the prerogative of the executive branch of government, are
consigned to the sound discretion of prosecutors, and under the
separation of powers doctrine are not subject to judicial fiat. Indeed, it
has long been recognized that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is
a matter, “particularly ill-suited to judicial review.” Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S. Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985).
Recognizing this fact, courts have long held that a civil rights plaintiff
may not seek relief in civil litigation in the form of an order directing
the criminal prosecution of some third parties, finding that civil
plaintiffs lack standing to make such claims and concluding that such
relief simply is unavailable in a civil lawsuit.
Smith v. Friel, No. 1:19-CV-943, 2019 WL 3025239, at *4 (M.D. Pa. June 4,
2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 1:19-0943, 2019 WL 3003380
(M.D. Pa. July 10, 2019), appeal dismissed, No. 19-2721, 2019 WL 7630987 (3d
Cir. Sept. 18, 2019). Therefore, this aspect of Liptok’s complaint should be
dismissed with prejudice.
15
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III.

Recommendation
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s motion for leave to

proceed in forma pauperis, (Doc. 2), is CONDITIONALLY GRANTED but IT IS
RECOMMENDED that the plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed with prejudice to the
extent that it seeks to institute a criminal prosecution and otherwise dismissed
without prejudice to the plaintiff filing an amended complaint which complies with
federal pleading requirements.
The plaintiff is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings,
recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in
28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the
disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party
shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and
all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the
portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which
objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing
requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall
make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings
or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge,
however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or
where required by law, and may consider the record developed before
the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis
of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall
witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with
instructions.
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Submitted this 23rd day of December 2021.
S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge
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